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MuNICIPAL CoRPORATioNs-VALIDITY OF "PIECEMEAL" ZoNING AS
APPLIED TO BUILDING UNDER CONSTRUCTION-Shortly after plaintiff obtained a building permit and commenced work on the excavation for a laundry
and dry-cleaning plant in an unzoned section of the City of Huntsville, the city
adopted a new zoning ordinance which limited to residential uses an area of approximately two blocks in which plaintiff's property was situated. On appeal
from a decree dismissing a bill to enjoin enforcement of the new zoning ordin~ce, held, reversed. Since the enabling statute required that zoning regulations
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RECENT DECISIONS

III

should be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan,1 an ordinance
which did not zone the whole municipality was void. Johnson v. City of Huntsville, ( Ala. 1947) 29 S. ( 2d) 342.
It is well established that the police power of a state is vested in the state
legislature and cannot be exercised by a murticipality without a delegation of the
power by the state.2 Since zoning is an exercise of the police zoning power,8 the
authority to zone must usually be traced to a state enabling statute.4 Therefore,
the power cannot be exercised otherwise than as prescribed in the statute, and
the provisions of the statute must be strictly followed. 5 In addition to the requirements of the enabling statute, zoning ordinances must be reasonable and
designed to accomplish some purpose within the scope of the police power. 6 In
this connection, it has been held that property similarly situated must be zoned
alike.7 Either as a matter of statutory interpretation, then, or as a requirement
that zoning ordinances meet certain standards of reasonableness, ordinances
which do not take into consideration the whole area of the municipality are
generally held bad. 8 In the principal case the _ordinance fails to meet the test of
reasonableness on other grounds. The plaintiff had obtained a permit and had
begun work on his building prior to the enactment of the ordinance placing his
property in a residential section. Although there is some conflict of authority on
the question of whether a municipality may force the abolition of a non-c~nforming use in existence at the time the ordinance is adopted,9 the tendency,
1

Ala. Code (1940) tit. 37, § 777 provides, "Such regulations shall be made in
accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets,
to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers. • • ." The Alabama act is substantially the same as the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act prepared by the Department of Commerce.
2
Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722 (1920); Friend v. City
of €hicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609 (1913); City of St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo.
466, 41 s.w. 1094 (1897).
8
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. II4 (1926);
Knickerbocker Ice° Co. v. Sprague, (D.C. N. Y. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 499; People ex
rel. Kirby v. Rockford, 363 Ill. 531, 2 N.E. (2d) 842 (1936).
4
If the state constitution grants broad powers to the municipalities, it may not be
necessary to resort to an enabling statute. Cf. Ekem v. City of Milwaukee, 190 Wis.
633, 209 N.W. 860 (1926).
5
Fierst v. William Penn Memorial Corp., 311 Pa. 263, 166 A. 761 (1933);
Benton v. Phillips, 191 Ark. 961, 88 S.W. (2d) 828 (1935); Ford v. Hutchinson,
140 Kan. 307, 37 P. (2d) 39 (1934).
6
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S. Ct. 447 (1929); State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. II6, 49 S. Ct. 50 (1928);
Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932).
7
Hedgcock v. Reed, 91 Colo. 155, 13 P. (2d) 264 (1932); Holden Co. v.
Connor, 257 Mich. 580, 241 N.W. 915 (1932).
8
Olean v. Conkling, 156 Misc. 63, 283 N.Y.S. 66 (1935); Youngstown v. Kahn
Bros. Building Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925); City of Utica v. Hanna,
202 App. Div. 610, 195 N.Y.S. 225 (1922); Harris v. Village of Dobbs Ferry, 208
App. Div. 853, 204 N.Y.S. 325 (1924).
9
Some cases allow the prohibition of a use which has the characteristics of a common law nuisance: Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, II8 P. 714 (1911); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143 (1915); State ex rel. Dema Realty
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where work has started, is to refuse to interpret the ordinance as having a
retroactive effect unless there is expiicit language to that effect,10 or to assume
that vested rights cannot be affected except where they constitute nuisanci,s.11
The commencement of work on the land, under the better view, is held to constitute sufficient change of position to protect the land owner under this docfrine.12 As a result, the ordinance in the principal case would probably be unreasonable as applied to the plaintiff even in the ;ibsence of a statutory requirement that zoning be accomplished in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
Even though one of the chief reasons for requiring a comprehensive plan is to
secure orderly rather than haphazard development of the community, under
some circumstances it may be desirable to leave certain undeveloped area open
to unrestricted use.13 In such cases, if the ordinance is adopted after full consideration and as part of a plan for orderly development, it ~hould make no difference to the validity of the particular zoning ordinance whether it is formally
zoned as an unrestricted area or is left unzoned subject to later classification.
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Co. V; Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 S. 314 (1929). One case, New Orleans v. Liberty
Shop, 157 La. 26, IOI S. 798 (1924), holds that zoning for residential use makes a
business a nuisance which, can be prohibited; contra, Jones v. Los Angeles, 2II Cal.
304, 295 P. 14 (1930); City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 111. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
10 Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W. 838 (1929); Adams v.
Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N.W. 86 (1928).
11 Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707 (1930);
City of Lansing v. Dawley, 247 Mich. 394, 225 N.W. 500 (1929); Rice v. Van
Vranken, 132 Misc. 82,229 N.Y.S. 32 (1928), affd., 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y.S.
506 (1929) and-255 N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304 (1930):
12 Rice v. Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y.S. 32 (1928), affd., 225 App.
Div. 179, 232 N.Y.S. 506 (1929) and 255 N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304 (1930); Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W. 838 (1929). A mere application for,
or receipt of a license is not enough, Ware v. Wichita, II3 Kan. 153, 214 P. 99
(1923). In Western Theological Seminary v. City of. Evanston, 325 Ill. 5n, 156
N.E. 778 (1927), purchase of land in reliance on existing zoning is held enough. In
Brett v. Building Commissioner of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924),
the court held that there must be substantial completion of the building.'
18 Cf. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y: 222, 15 N.E. (2d)
587 (1938), which holds extension of zoning to previously unzoned area is unreasonable because the property could not be used profitably at the time for residential purposes. See also BASSET, ZoNING 90 ( I 940).

